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This article highlights some of the findings in 
the author’s new book, Licensing Occupations: 
Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? 
which is available from the Upjohn Institute 
(see p. 7).
The licensing of occupations often 
is accused of being stealth regulation 
that operates under the public policy 
radar screen. Unlike other labor market 
institutions, such as laws regulating 
unions or the minimum wage, the 
regulation of occupations has received 
little attention by the press, academics, 
or policymakers. However, this lack of 
attention is not because occupational 
licensing is diminishing in the labor 
market. Figure 1 shows that the growth 
of occupational licensing in the United 
States has increased far more than unions, 
a more widely studied labor market 
institution. Since the 1950s, licensing 
coverage has grown from about 5 percent 
of the workforce to more than 20 percent, 
while unions have declined from about 
a third of the workforce to less than 13 
percent, and to fewer than 8 percent in 
the private sector. Approximately 50 
occupations are licensed in all states, 
and about 800 occupations are similarly 
regulated in at least one state.
Occupational regulation has varying 
levels of stringency. The toughest form of 
regulation is licensure, where it is illegal 
for a person to practice a profession 
without first meeting state standards, 
which usually involve detailed education 
requirements, testimonials of “good 
SOURCE: Tabulations for licensing coverage 
for the 1950s are from the Council of State 
Governments (1952), which lists licensed 
occupations in the public use Census Sample 
for 1950. For the 1960s, the tabulations are 
from Greene (1969), which links the available 
listing of licensed occupations to census 
tabulations. The data for the 1980s are from 
Kleiner (1990) tabulations; new estimates 
were developed for 2000. Estimates for 
union density are from the Bureau of Labor 














Figure 1  Comparisons in the Trends 
of Two Labor Market Institutions: 
Licensing and Unionization
moral character,” and a test. A second, 
less restrictive form of regulation is 
certification, which gives states a “right-
to-title” protection for persons meeting 
predetermined standards. Those without 
certification may perform the duties 
of the occupation but may not use the 
title. A third and least restrictive form of 
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Issue Key findings
Estimate of percent 
of workforce covered 
by licensing
Using Department of Labor and Census Data, percent of workforce 
covered by licensing is approximately 20 percent, a growth of 11 percent 
over the past 15 years.
Potential benefits of 
licensing
Increased standardization of services and reduction in the potential 
“loss aversion” by consumers due to poor quality service. 
Evidence of the 
benefits of licensing
Some evidence that the insured and higher-income gain from stricter 
licensing but no measurable impact on overall quality.
Price and wage 
effects of licensing
Licensing drives up prices, and the overall wage effect relative to 
unlicensed occupations in cross-section data is 10–12 percent, but 




Within an occupation, the percentage employment growth rate is 
approximately 20 percent greater in states that do not require licensing, 
but impacts differ widely based on the methods and occupations.
State variations in 
licensing
Much variation in the number of occupations licensed by states and the 
percent of the workforce covered by licensing laws. Case studies show 
that political spending by the occupational associations is an important 
factor for who gets regulated. 
Redistribution and
lost output due to 
licensing
Estimated redistribution effects to regulated occupations of  between 
$116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars, and lost output of  $34.8 
and $41.7 billion per year, which is less than 0.1  percent of total 
consumption expenditures.
U.S. and EU 
comparisons
Both economies regulate entry but there is often no exam beyond 
university or trade school to obtain a license for many of the professions 
in the EU.  EU nations regulate prices charged and the organizational 
structure of the professions to a greater extent than the United States. 
Wage effects for licensing are around 1 percent using cross-section 
estimates, but the impacts vary widely based on methods, occupations, 
and toughness of restrictions.
Table 1  Key Findings of the Impact of Licensing on Enhancing Quality or 
Restricting Competition
regulation is registration, which usually 
requires individuals to file their names, 
addresses, and qualifications with a 
government agency before practicing 
in the occupation. Registration often 
includes posting a bond or filing a fee.
Although the regulation of individuals 
in occupations dates to ancient times, the 
guilds of medieval Europe are most often 
mentioned as examples of the imposition 
of tough restrictions on entering a craft or 
occupation. In the United States through 
much of the nineteenth century, few 
restrictions were imposed on occupations 
we often think of as licensed, such as 
doctors and lawyers. During the past 
50 years, however, with the increase 
in complexity of jobs, especially in the 
service sector, licensing of individuals in 
their jobs emerged as one of the fastest-
growing labor market institutions in the 
United States and other industrialized 
nations.
One of the major justifications for 
occupational licensing is that it increases 
service quality. Yet the available studies 
offer little evidence that licensing 
individuals has an impact on the quality 
of service received by consumers. For 
example, my examination of data from 
Wisconsin and Minnesota finds no 
evidence of differences in consumer 
complaints between Wisconsin, which 
licensed certain health care occupations, 
such as physical therapists, respiratory 
care providers, and physician assistants, 
and complaints to state boards in 
Minnesota, which certified the same 
occupations.
Malpractice insurance premiums 
can also serve as the arbitrator of the 
effectiveness of licensing as a way to 
mitigate the harmful effects of inept 
practitioners. If licensing works as 
intended, it should reduce mistakes 
by licensed relative to unlicensed 
practitioners. The insurance industry 
would then provide lower premiums 
for practitioners in regulated states 
because licensing statutes (such as testing 
and background checks) would have 
weeded out incompetent or unscrupulous 
practitioners. However, my examination 
of the rates charged nationally for 
practitioners who are licensed in some 
U.S. states and not in others reveals 
that no price breaks on malpractice 
in insurance premiums were given to 
practitioners in licensed states. 
Then what are the potential impacts 
of licensing? Restricting labor supply is 
one. For example, there was a decline 
in employment growth for librarians, 
respiratory therapists, and dietitians and 
nutritionists from 1990 to 2000 in those 
states that regulate these occupations 
relative those that do not. The estimates 
using census data show that, for the 
licensed occupations that were regulated 
in about one-half of all states, licensing 
reduced the percentage growth rate of 
employment by a statistically significant 
20 percent. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the impact of licensing on hourly 
earnings compared to similar unlicensed 
occupations was about 10–17 percent, 
depending on the occupations and the 
methods used in the analysis.
 There is considerable variation among 
the states in the number of occupations 
licensed and in the percentage of the 
workforce that is covered by licensing 
laws. For example, California licenses 
almost 180 occupations that cover more 
than 30 percent of its workforce. On 
the other hand, Kansas licenses about 
50 occupations, and these regulatory 
laws cover less than 12 percent of 
its workforce. If licensing has no 
productivity impacts yet increases 
spending, then simulations of the net 
expenses of the labor market regulation 
indicate it costs the economy about $38 
billion in lost service output per year.
The regulation of occupations in 
Europe takes a somewhat different form 
from that in the United States. Rather 
than focusing on postgraduation tests, 
countries such as France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom tend to regulate the 
prices charged and the organizational 
structure that is allowed by practitioners. 
With the smaller differences in the 
wage structure in Europe and the way 
occupations are licensed, the overall 
3
Employment Research JANUARY 2006
impact of licensing on hourly wages is 
much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in 
Licensing Occupations are summarized 
in Table 1. Given these results of the 
labor market impacts of licensing, 
other forms of regulation, such as 
certification, are suggested. Alternative 
forms of occupational regulation may 
provide consumers with more choice 
than licensing and reduce the potential 
monopoly impacts of licensing in the 
labor market. In order to better monitor 
the economic impacts of licensing, data 
on this form of regulation should be 
provided to academics and policymakers 
in the major national labor market data 
sources, such as the Current Population 
Survey. With more data and analysis, 
the public, workers, and policymakers 
can more accurately assess whether 
occupational licensing is ensuring quality 
or restricting competition.
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the 
Industrial Relations Center at the University 
of Minnesota–Twin Cities.
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Employment and Wage 
Effects of Privatization 
Evidence from Transition Economies
The greatest opposition to 
privatizing a firm usually comes from the 
firm’s own employees, who are fearful 
of wage cuts and job losses. Workers’ 
apprehensions about privatization are 
consistent with standard economic 
analyses, whereby new private owners 
reduce the firm’s labor costs in response 
to harder budget constraints and stronger 
profit-related incentives. Discussions of 
this “efficiency effect” of privatization, 
however, implicitly assume that the 
firm’s output remains constant or at 
least does not increase. But lower costs 
may increase the firm’s market share as 
well as total quantity demanded for the 
industry, and the new private owners may 
be more entrepreneurial in marketing, 
innovation, and entering new markets. In 
such cases, the firm’s output will tend to 
rise, and if this “scale effect” dominates, 
then privatization could cause a net 
employment increase. 
The implications of privatization 
for wages are also ambiguous. New 
owners may reduce wages as part of 
a general cost-cutting policy, but if 
the firm expands, it may have to offer 
higher wages to attract new workers. 
New private owners may also be more 
likely to adopt skill-biased technologies, 
resulting in a compositional shift toward 
higher-paid workers. Depending on the 
relative strength of such factors, wages 
may either rise or fall as a result of 
privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis 
fail to provide definitive predictions 
on the wage and employment effects 
of privatization, but also the existing 
empirical evidence is both scant and 
inconclusive, containing both negative 
and positive estimates of the effects on 
workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute, 
in collaboration with partners from 
Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh 
and the Central European University 
Labor Project in Budapest, has recently 
undertaken an empirical analysis of 
the effects of privatization on the wage 
bill, employment, and wage rates of 
firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine—countries where thousands of 
businesses were privatized in a relatively 
short period of time during the 1990s. 
These four countries had varied success 
with privatization reforms. Hungary was 
considered one of the most successful, 
Russia and Ukraine were less successful, 
and Romania was somewhere in the 
middle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
the average real wage bill and percent 
private ownership in each country. At 
this aggregate level of analysis, a strong 
negative correlation is evident in all 
four countries, which would seem to 
corroborate workers’ fears and most 
economists’ expectations. However, 
several other events that could affect 
the wage bill occurred during the 1990s 
(including macroeconomic shocks and 
market liberalization), and the firms 
selected for privatization may have been 
declining for extraneous reasons. To 
deal with these potentially confounding 
factors and estimate the causal effects 
of privatization on workers, the project 
has analyzed microdata on firms that 
have been linked over time. The methods 
applied to estimate the privatization 
effects at the firm level draw upon some 
of those used in evaluations of labor 
market training programs in the United 
States. 
Privatization Programs and 
Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large 
enterprise privatization differed quite 
significantly across the four countries in 
this study. Hungary got off to an early 
start in ownership transformation and 
maintained a consistent case-by-case 
